Foreword

Promoting Meaningful Compliance with Climate Change Commitments

Eileen Claussen, President, Pew Center on Global Climate Change

The ultimate success and credibility of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, or any future climate agreement, will depend on whether most, if not all, Parties meet their greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments. A critical factor in achieving this goal is having a system that is able to identify, sanction, and also deter non-compliance. Traditionally, international agreements have had weak or ineffective compliance systems because of sovereignty concerns. There are, however, means outside the compliance regime of the Protocol to work toward similar outcomes.

The Pew Center has commissioned this report to provide insights on several factors that are often overlooked in the debate on compliance: the role of national compliance systems; national and international monitoring and verification; and the willingness of Parties to participate in the climate change regime. These three factors can significantly contribute to achieving a meaningful and effective compliance system. The report concludes that:

• National compliance systems should be promoted as a means to ensure compliance with the Kyoto Protocol or any future climate change agreement and should seek to balance market-based instruments with strong enforcement;
  
  
• National compliance with international climate change agreements must be verifiable to ensure credibility, and monitoring and verifying compliance with the Kyoto Protocol can benefit significantly from integrating existing national compliance systems into the international system; and
  
  
• Broad participation in any climate change regime is as important as meeting the commitments of the agreements themselves; the Kyoto Mechanisms can play an important role in boosting both participation and compliance.
  
  

T he importance of Parties actually complying with their targets cannot be overstated. While this report outlines benefits from having flexibility and balance in compliance regimes, the damage from non-compliance — even if later remedied — can be a loss of the trust and good faith that underpins international agreements. We prefer the approach to compliance described in this report rather than ensuring compliance by making the rules weaker.

The Pew Center and the authors appreciate the valuable input and thoughtful comments of Robert Nordhaus, Kyle Danish, Glenn Wiser, Alistair Lucas, and Thomas Husted. The authors would also like to thank Gabriela Donini, Adriana Faria, Maria Junco, and Tricia Choe for their research assistance.