Hill Address
Address by Robert Hill, Minister for the Environment and Heritage of Australia
April 17, 2001
9:30 am [EDST]
Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
Eileen Claussen: We tried to get someone from the Bush administration to speak at this conference, but we were told they are still developing their policy. And so they did not have someone who could come and speak. And so we looked around the world at the map to try to find someone who could deliver some remarks that might be in sync with what the administration might be thinking of. And so Senator Hill from Australia, you're the person we thought might do the best here.
Robert Hill is Minister for the Environment and Heritage of Australia, and senator for South Australia. He served as minister since 1998 and has represented South Australia in the Senate since 1980. He's been on lots of different committees and done lots of different things, and has been involved in this process for probably as long as almost anyone. And so I think he will give us an interesting perspective. And without knowing what he is going to say I'm sure it will be different from the perspective that we just heard.
Senator Hill.
MINISTER ROBERT HILL: Thank you for that introduction and particularly my responsibility to represent the United States administration. [Laughter.] I'll try and do it fairly and objectively, common, differentiated, and so forth.
Well, I'm pleased to be back again because I am an optimist and you have to be in this business. I've been doing this now for five years. I came in post the Berlin meeting, but I've attended each COP since Geneva, and it's been an interesting experience.
I thought what I should do to try and make the program, or contribute to the program in a useful way, would be to build upon what Mr. Estrada has said and try and relate it back to where we are now. I suppose it could have been decided to start with the science today rather than follow these presentations with the science, but we basically accept the science and we think with that comes a responsibility. From an Australian perspective, it's particularly meaningful because we live in an ancient continent with very fragile ecosystems, very sensitive to drought and flood. And, of course, natural resources are a critical part, a large part of our economy. So we are, as a country, vulnerable to the threat of climate change and we understand it.
We therefore accept our responsibility to play a part and be a part of an ultimate solution. We've taken the Kyoto outcome seriously. We believe in Kyoto, that we got a fair target, much more challenging than a lot of people would appreciate. But nevertheless, fair in terms of requiring an equality of effort from us that was much the same as from other developed countries. And we've proceeded since Kyoto with the task of meeting that commitment.
So, in other words, we haven't waited for ratification or the protocol to come into legal effect. Really since late 1997, we have been implementing a domestic program with the goal of achieving our target, and that program has developed in the years since and our financial commitment to it has increased. I mention that because I think it's another aspect to what Mr. Estrada was saying. On the one hand, we're talking about an international instrument. But on the other hand, we find that all countries -- I think I can say, certainly most -- actually are responding. You can argue about whether they're responding to the instrument or potential threat within the instrument, or whether they're simply responding because they accept that they have a responsibility to play a part in addressing this very serious global problem.
We established a greenhouse agency specifically dedicated to the task. I think we're the first developed country to do so. Our voluntary cooperation program with industry now has the majority of our major emitters involved. We've passed legislation to require a further uptick of renewable energy. By 2010 we expect renewable energy in Australia to be over 12 percent, which will be up among the highest in the world.
We're amending our national building code to introduce new standards of energy efficiency for domestic and commercial buildings. We're introducing new standards of emission control for motor vehicles and new complementary fuel quality legislation. We're investing heavily in transitional fuels such as compressed natural gas. We're requiring new standards of existing power stations in terms of their emissions. And we're sharing the costs with industry of major upgrades of energy efficiency in existing infrastructure. We've backed the program with approximately $1 billion dollars of public funding, Australian dollars, which, on a per capita basis, again, is among the highest in the world.
And so we, as with others, I think, can demonstrate that since we started to engage in this process not so many years ago, we have, in fact, implemented significant domestic change. And interestingly along the road, perhaps not surprisingly, we've been able to work out how we can use that change to benefit other matters, particularly, in our case, matters relating to our natural resource management, where we've been able to use greenhouse to help assist with solutions to salinity and land degradation. And, of course, we link greenhouse to our drive to promote renewable and sustainable energy, which in itself will bring significant economic opportunities for the future. We tend to focus on the cost, but there are within this debate significant economic opportunities as well.
There's still much to be done even in our country to fully implement this domestic program that I've talked about, and we can do that with or without an internationally binding instrument. And we will do it with our without such an instrument. But we're also conscious that to obtain the full -- to achieve the full abatement opportunities at least cost -- will require us to move in the future to new programs which are unlikely without some form of internationally binding commitment by all players.
For example, the only way in which any country can ultimately be assured that it will achieve its target is, in fact, if emissions are kept -- generally spoken of as being treated in association with a form of trading. That's easy to say, but very difficult for any country to implement without an assurance that others are going to accept an equal responsibility, both with oil -- you know with oil, it's political difficulties and cost ramifications. So even for Australia in the years ahead, if we are to move into the next phase of response, we're going to need some form of international instrument to ensure a level playing field.
Now what Mr. Estrada said in relation to the [UN Framework] convention, I agree. The convention in many ways, however, I think is now seen as an aspirational document. I think -- well, I know it's the odd politician around the world who would prefer not to now reflect upon the commitments that they made in Rio. The protocol, however, is a very different thing because what we're talking about for developed countries is something that is legally binding, and the targets obviously with that take a new meaning.
The weakness in the protocol, if that's the right expression, is that countries accepted targets without knowing what the rules would be upon which they are based. And Kyoto left undecided very significant issues relating to costs, particularly the flexibility mechanisms, major issues in relation to sinks as opposed to emissions, and the extent to which sinks can be utilized as a contribution towards net carbon reductions. And, of course, the significant issues relating to compliance costs. Therefore, each country in accepting a target in Kyoto assumedly did so on the basis of what it believed those rules would ultimately be.
And when Mr. Estrada talks about the failure of leadership at The Hague, I'm conscious of what he said, failure of leadership. Both he and I were sitting around that table. It is in many ways because the debate has got down to the detail that will determine costs, compliance and coverage. And those issues in some ways are harder to resolve than a commitment to a target without the rules having been settled.
But the additional issue that lies in the background, which some have difficulty in appreciating, is the issue relating to participation of developing countries. I see Mr. Estrada's chart and I don't dispute the figures. But we and some others face a reality that if we accept a cost of carbon which a competitor of ours doesn't accept, it has the potential to lead to movement of industry to a third party with no greenhouse benefit at all. And that economic distortion was never intended to be part of the process.
And this issue, which I think remains a critical issue, is still to be resolved. It was there at The Hague. It will be there at Bonn in July. When we talked -- it's so easy to talk about common and differentiated responsibilities, but when we reduce that to costs of parties and therefore commitments that mean that the protocol is simply not being used as a cost shifting device with no net carbon benefit at all, it is more complex. But that is the responsibility that we are expecting of developing countries.
We believe it is possible to get to that point and we believe that the secret to do so is through differentiation. One of the great achievements of Kyoto was the acceptance that each country has a different cost of abatement, that each economy is differently structured, and an effective solution will only be one in which we look for an equality of effort, in the first instance from developed countries, but ultimately from all countries. That principle of differentiation, to me, is the way forward in looking for commitments from developing countries as well, which will ultimately be necessary as we address the issue of ratification, certainly in Australia and I suspect in the United States the same issue dominates the debate.
So, Madam Chair, where do we go from here? As I said, we've accepted our Kyoto target. We have domestic programs that we're implementing with the objective of achieving it. That remains our primary objective, and, as I said, there's much that we can do and there's much that all countries can do in the next few years without a legally binding target.
We intend to maintain our greenhouse reduction program, and we trust that other parties to the convention will do likewise. We recognize, however, that this will not lead to optimal outcomes in terms of level of abatement and the full utilization of least cost options without an international agreement setting binding targets. As we've demonstrated by our actions in international fora since late 1997, we've supported the Kyoto Protocol despite the fact that it's incomplete and despite its shortcomings in the potential that it provides for leakage of industry to developing countries.
We've sought to complete the protocol through the negotiation of rules, with an emphasis on least-cost abatement options, broad coverage of sources and sinks, and an encouraging rather than punitive compliance regime. We've sought to address the shortcomings on participation consistent with the common but differentiated responsibilities of the convention. And we've done so in conjunction with a number of other parties who've generally shared our views on these key issues. And that remains our preferred approach.
It's our view, however, that it's not possible to have an effective protocol without the United States of America. If the United States has therefore determined that the protocol is unacceptable, presumably because it believes the unresolved issues in and around the protocol of which I've mentioned cannot be resolved in a fair and effective way, then we'll want to explore with the United States its views on other forms of international architecture which can deliver an optimal global response. Whether through the protocol or otherwise, the issues I've canvassed will need to be resolved, and we are committed to constructively continuing a dialogue to seek their resolution -- issues of cost, issues of sinks, issues of compliance, and issues of developing country participation.
And, in fact, Madam Chair, I suspect that in settling the detail we may well be assisting in the design of the most appropriate form of instrument or instruments within which they would be incorporated. And I think, after all, it's worth remembering that actions in reducing global greenhouse concentrations is what really counts, rather than the international architecture.
I'd like to simply finish by, again, congratulating the Pew Center on the leadership that it is providing in the debate which is so critical to ultimately achieving the right policy solutions and seeing the implementation of those solutions. That responsibility that you've accepted through this Center is something that you shouldn't underestimate. It's particularly important. And, of course, it is supported by those corporations who have already, without an international instrument, accepted that they also share in a responsibility, and I wish to commend them. In some ways, the fact that industry - we have examples of industry across the world that is showing a lead in its own actions in reducing the carbon intensity of their processes, in part inspires us all as governments to do better. Interestingly, I suspect they will be in the end the economic winners as well. And I suspect countries that do move early and take full advantage of the least cost opportunities will be economic winners as well.
Thank you for inviting me back again, and I hope I can come back next year with better news.
[APPLAUSE]
Eileen Claussen: Well thank you and let me just say that we - no, don't go because we really want you to answer some questions. But while you're coming back, let me just say that we love the 33 companies that we work with, but they don't actually support us in any financial way. They give us lots of support and lots of input and we work together really closely, but our funding does come from charitable foundations, primarily the Pew Charitable Trust. So I just wanted to clear that up.
Senator Hill, I know you'd love to take questions so why don't we see where they are? There's a microphone over there and that will just make everything easier for all of us.
Q: My name is David Benjamin and I'm from Third Planet. I'd like to know how the work on the global warming policy in Australia has, if it has at all, impacted your foreign aid work and capacity building that you do in the Pacific region? And second question is, do you think there is a role to play in global warming work for the Green Corps?
MR. HILL: It hasn't had any - well, its consequence on our support for developing countries in the region has been largely incidental, except to say that we're supporting such countries in greenhouse programs in terms of adaptation, in terms of accounting and reporting, and we're also working with countries in the region in terms of joint projects which hopefully will evolve into CDM-type projects in the future. And the Green Corps, I didn't understand that question.
Eileen Claussen: It's Mikhail Gorbachev's program, the Green Cross.
MR. HILL: Well, I don't know how that affects me?
Eileen Claussen: Okay, other questions. I think it's just easier if you go to the microphone. I mean, maybe you should just go to the microphone.
Q: Benito Muller from Oxford. Oxford is quite remote and we don't get news that often. And I was wondering, we do know that this developing country participation is heavily on the agenda. But could you be a bit more specific on how you could envisage -- if Kyoto is scuppered, how this participation should function? What do you expect developing countries to take on more than they would do under Kyoto?
Thank you.
MR. HILL: We haven't defined that because we believe it would be presumptuous to do so. But we've sought to enter into a debate and we do it every meeting with developing countries. It often is a fairly one-sided debate. But as I said, as we think through the principle of differentiation it should be possible to make commitments for the future that are relative to a range of different factors, in particular the structure of the economy in question, its strength, population growth, and the like.
We, as with others, have developed a range of indicators which we think can be of assistance in this regard. We think, as the CDM develops, there may be opportunities within that as part of a total formula. And we have other ideas in relation to technology transfer, which is going to be a critical part of it as well.
In addition to that, we do recognize that there will be a need for incentives, and we've indicated and particularly started a discussion at the Hague with developing countries as to what form those incentives and support might take. So nobody says it's the commitment that the developed countries - that it acquits to the commitment that developing countries have taken. We accept the obligations of the convention, that it does require developed countries to lead. But in terms of global outcome it is going to require a genuine participation and commitment of all.
Q: Caps? Caps?
MR. HILL: Well I used the word commitment, but targets. The timetable would be different, the form of the target might be different. We think there's a long way to go within the debate, but we think that the debate needs -- well, we would like to have seen the debate progress further than what it has to date. A little too much finger pointing and I think not enough actually sitting down and working on it.
Eileen Claussen: I think we can take two other questions. Yeah, if you'd just go to the microphone, please. Yes, go ahead.
Q: But my name is Jiahua Pan from the IPCC Working Group 3, Technical Support Unit. Well, my question is something very general. It's the maintainability of equity. If we look at the income distribution in the developed and developing countries, you can see that using the genie index as a measurement, in the developed countries the genie co-efficient or index is something, you know, between -- it's around 0.25. Equity is zero, and, you know, inequality is 1. But if we look a the developing countries, the genie index is about 0.4. In Brazil for example, it's 0.61.
That means that in the developed countries it's more equal and in the developing countries it's more unequal in terms of income distribution. That would suggest that for the developed countries we are equal, but we do not want to extend our equity to the poor countries. And for the poor countries, we're unequal, but we would like to be equal with the rich.
So I think that's the current mentality of equity. So I would like to ask your idea about if there is any possibility to change the mentality of equity?
Thanks.
MR. HILL: I have no quarrel with that aspiration, and what I hinted at is I think that this process shouldn't be seen as totally as threat. I think that part of a closing of that equity gap may incorporate the opportunity to take economic and environmental advantage from evolving technologies and processes. And that's part of the engagement that I would like to see take place with developing countries. No one is arguing that developing countries should come out of this process poorer. Everyone accepts their right to develop and their right to improve standards of living. What we would wish, however, to occur is that that now occur in a way that is less carbon intense than has been the process of development in the past. And we now have the capacity to see that, in fact, becomes a reality. The goal is therefore a win-win goal, both, as I said, environmentally and economically.
Eileen Claussen: Last question.
Q: Paul Fauteux from Canada, Senator.
I'd like to draw you out, if I may, on the issue of timing of enhanced developing country participation. As Ambassador Estrada reminded us, the convention was -- basically it deals to the effect that developed countries would go first. And as Ambassador Estrada also reminded us, it's expected that one of the critical issues in the negotiations for the second commitment period would be the form of enhanced developing country participation.
You referred to efforts on the past of Australia, Canada and other group members in The Hague to start a dialogue on what form those commitments might take. I do get the impression that the current administration in Washington, if they haven't actually reached that conclusion, are heavily leaning in favor of the view that we can 't wait till the second commitment period, we have to have developing countries join developed countries in taking measures to address climate change first.
I was wondering if you could tell us where Australia stands in that respect.
MR. HILL: Again, we haven't sought to be prescriptive. We don't think that that's an effective response. I acknowledged in answer to a previous question I anticipate different timetables. I anticipate different forms of commitment. I think that one of the -- one of the -- I've been hesitant to speak for the [US] administration. Perhaps one would have a go at speaking for the last administration, because I think in many ways it was addressing the same issue in that it was negotiating at The Hague and elsewhere to a background that it knew that unless it had a formula, it had a resolution to the developing country issue, it simply was never going to have a ratified protocol. It's a fair odd -- I mean you have a great advantage in the United States where your administration can negotiate something that whilst at the same time it can say, well, it's another party that ultimately determines whether it becomes legally binding or not. But they would never -- you know, I understood the administration was always arguing in good faith. It therefore knew that it always had to find an answer to the issue raised by the Congress, which is an issue slightly different to Australia. The issue in the United States, I think looking in the global perspective, was simply that whilst on a per capita basis, the carbon is much less intense in China, a small fraction of the United States, nevertheless if our bottom line in this whole exercise is actually to stabilize global greenhouse gases and emissions from the developing world are about to overtake the developed world, then, politically, an administration has got to show that every party is going to play its card.
And the response from China, of course, will be, well, we are already building our economy in a less carbon intense way. In some ways it's being an incidental benefit coming out of programs designed to improve air quality. But that is politically insufficient, because it's not seen as a commitment. But it doesn't seem to me that if the developing country says -- I hear them say that they're already implementing their own programs to achieve a better outcome. It doesn't seem to be a huge step forward to be able to design and express that in terms of a commitment and take a step, therefore, towards resolving a problem that both the past and the existing administration in the United States will have in terms of congressional approval.
Q: Thank you.
Eileen Claussen: Thank you very much.
April 17, 2001
9:30 am [EDST]
Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
Eileen Claussen: We tried to get someone from the Bush administration to speak at this conference, but we were told they are still developing their policy. And so they did not have someone who could come and speak. And so we looked around the world at the map to try to find someone who could deliver some remarks that might be in sync with what the administration might be thinking of. And so Senator Hill from Australia, you're the person we thought might do the best here.
Robert Hill is Minister for the Environment and Heritage of Australia, and senator for South Australia. He served as minister since 1998 and has represented South Australia in the Senate since 1980. He's been on lots of different committees and done lots of different things, and has been involved in this process for probably as long as almost anyone. And so I think he will give us an interesting perspective. And without knowing what he is going to say I'm sure it will be different from the perspective that we just heard.
Senator Hill.
MINISTER ROBERT HILL: Thank you for that introduction and particularly my responsibility to represent the United States administration. [Laughter.] I'll try and do it fairly and objectively, common, differentiated, and so forth.Well, I'm pleased to be back again because I am an optimist and you have to be in this business. I've been doing this now for five years. I came in post the Berlin meeting, but I've attended each COP since Geneva, and it's been an interesting experience.
I thought what I should do to try and make the program, or contribute to the program in a useful way, would be to build upon what Mr. Estrada has said and try and relate it back to where we are now. I suppose it could have been decided to start with the science today rather than follow these presentations with the science, but we basically accept the science and we think with that comes a responsibility. From an Australian perspective, it's particularly meaningful because we live in an ancient continent with very fragile ecosystems, very sensitive to drought and flood. And, of course, natural resources are a critical part, a large part of our economy. So we are, as a country, vulnerable to the threat of climate change and we understand it.
We therefore accept our responsibility to play a part and be a part of an ultimate solution. We've taken the Kyoto outcome seriously. We believe in Kyoto, that we got a fair target, much more challenging than a lot of people would appreciate. But nevertheless, fair in terms of requiring an equality of effort from us that was much the same as from other developed countries. And we've proceeded since Kyoto with the task of meeting that commitment.
So, in other words, we haven't waited for ratification or the protocol to come into legal effect. Really since late 1997, we have been implementing a domestic program with the goal of achieving our target, and that program has developed in the years since and our financial commitment to it has increased. I mention that because I think it's another aspect to what Mr. Estrada was saying. On the one hand, we're talking about an international instrument. But on the other hand, we find that all countries -- I think I can say, certainly most -- actually are responding. You can argue about whether they're responding to the instrument or potential threat within the instrument, or whether they're simply responding because they accept that they have a responsibility to play a part in addressing this very serious global problem.
We established a greenhouse agency specifically dedicated to the task. I think we're the first developed country to do so. Our voluntary cooperation program with industry now has the majority of our major emitters involved. We've passed legislation to require a further uptick of renewable energy. By 2010 we expect renewable energy in Australia to be over 12 percent, which will be up among the highest in the world.
We're amending our national building code to introduce new standards of energy efficiency for domestic and commercial buildings. We're introducing new standards of emission control for motor vehicles and new complementary fuel quality legislation. We're investing heavily in transitional fuels such as compressed natural gas. We're requiring new standards of existing power stations in terms of their emissions. And we're sharing the costs with industry of major upgrades of energy efficiency in existing infrastructure. We've backed the program with approximately $1 billion dollars of public funding, Australian dollars, which, on a per capita basis, again, is among the highest in the world.
And so we, as with others, I think, can demonstrate that since we started to engage in this process not so many years ago, we have, in fact, implemented significant domestic change. And interestingly along the road, perhaps not surprisingly, we've been able to work out how we can use that change to benefit other matters, particularly, in our case, matters relating to our natural resource management, where we've been able to use greenhouse to help assist with solutions to salinity and land degradation. And, of course, we link greenhouse to our drive to promote renewable and sustainable energy, which in itself will bring significant economic opportunities for the future. We tend to focus on the cost, but there are within this debate significant economic opportunities as well.
There's still much to be done even in our country to fully implement this domestic program that I've talked about, and we can do that with or without an internationally binding instrument. And we will do it with our without such an instrument. But we're also conscious that to obtain the full -- to achieve the full abatement opportunities at least cost -- will require us to move in the future to new programs which are unlikely without some form of internationally binding commitment by all players.
For example, the only way in which any country can ultimately be assured that it will achieve its target is, in fact, if emissions are kept -- generally spoken of as being treated in association with a form of trading. That's easy to say, but very difficult for any country to implement without an assurance that others are going to accept an equal responsibility, both with oil -- you know with oil, it's political difficulties and cost ramifications. So even for Australia in the years ahead, if we are to move into the next phase of response, we're going to need some form of international instrument to ensure a level playing field.
Now what Mr. Estrada said in relation to the [UN Framework] convention, I agree. The convention in many ways, however, I think is now seen as an aspirational document. I think -- well, I know it's the odd politician around the world who would prefer not to now reflect upon the commitments that they made in Rio. The protocol, however, is a very different thing because what we're talking about for developed countries is something that is legally binding, and the targets obviously with that take a new meaning.
The weakness in the protocol, if that's the right expression, is that countries accepted targets without knowing what the rules would be upon which they are based. And Kyoto left undecided very significant issues relating to costs, particularly the flexibility mechanisms, major issues in relation to sinks as opposed to emissions, and the extent to which sinks can be utilized as a contribution towards net carbon reductions. And, of course, the significant issues relating to compliance costs. Therefore, each country in accepting a target in Kyoto assumedly did so on the basis of what it believed those rules would ultimately be.
And when Mr. Estrada talks about the failure of leadership at The Hague, I'm conscious of what he said, failure of leadership. Both he and I were sitting around that table. It is in many ways because the debate has got down to the detail that will determine costs, compliance and coverage. And those issues in some ways are harder to resolve than a commitment to a target without the rules having been settled.
But the additional issue that lies in the background, which some have difficulty in appreciating, is the issue relating to participation of developing countries. I see Mr. Estrada's chart and I don't dispute the figures. But we and some others face a reality that if we accept a cost of carbon which a competitor of ours doesn't accept, it has the potential to lead to movement of industry to a third party with no greenhouse benefit at all. And that economic distortion was never intended to be part of the process.
And this issue, which I think remains a critical issue, is still to be resolved. It was there at The Hague. It will be there at Bonn in July. When we talked -- it's so easy to talk about common and differentiated responsibilities, but when we reduce that to costs of parties and therefore commitments that mean that the protocol is simply not being used as a cost shifting device with no net carbon benefit at all, it is more complex. But that is the responsibility that we are expecting of developing countries.
We believe it is possible to get to that point and we believe that the secret to do so is through differentiation. One of the great achievements of Kyoto was the acceptance that each country has a different cost of abatement, that each economy is differently structured, and an effective solution will only be one in which we look for an equality of effort, in the first instance from developed countries, but ultimately from all countries. That principle of differentiation, to me, is the way forward in looking for commitments from developing countries as well, which will ultimately be necessary as we address the issue of ratification, certainly in Australia and I suspect in the United States the same issue dominates the debate.
So, Madam Chair, where do we go from here? As I said, we've accepted our Kyoto target. We have domestic programs that we're implementing with the objective of achieving it. That remains our primary objective, and, as I said, there's much that we can do and there's much that all countries can do in the next few years without a legally binding target.
We intend to maintain our greenhouse reduction program, and we trust that other parties to the convention will do likewise. We recognize, however, that this will not lead to optimal outcomes in terms of level of abatement and the full utilization of least cost options without an international agreement setting binding targets. As we've demonstrated by our actions in international fora since late 1997, we've supported the Kyoto Protocol despite the fact that it's incomplete and despite its shortcomings in the potential that it provides for leakage of industry to developing countries.
We've sought to complete the protocol through the negotiation of rules, with an emphasis on least-cost abatement options, broad coverage of sources and sinks, and an encouraging rather than punitive compliance regime. We've sought to address the shortcomings on participation consistent with the common but differentiated responsibilities of the convention. And we've done so in conjunction with a number of other parties who've generally shared our views on these key issues. And that remains our preferred approach.
It's our view, however, that it's not possible to have an effective protocol without the United States of America. If the United States has therefore determined that the protocol is unacceptable, presumably because it believes the unresolved issues in and around the protocol of which I've mentioned cannot be resolved in a fair and effective way, then we'll want to explore with the United States its views on other forms of international architecture which can deliver an optimal global response. Whether through the protocol or otherwise, the issues I've canvassed will need to be resolved, and we are committed to constructively continuing a dialogue to seek their resolution -- issues of cost, issues of sinks, issues of compliance, and issues of developing country participation.
And, in fact, Madam Chair, I suspect that in settling the detail we may well be assisting in the design of the most appropriate form of instrument or instruments within which they would be incorporated. And I think, after all, it's worth remembering that actions in reducing global greenhouse concentrations is what really counts, rather than the international architecture.
I'd like to simply finish by, again, congratulating the Pew Center on the leadership that it is providing in the debate which is so critical to ultimately achieving the right policy solutions and seeing the implementation of those solutions. That responsibility that you've accepted through this Center is something that you shouldn't underestimate. It's particularly important. And, of course, it is supported by those corporations who have already, without an international instrument, accepted that they also share in a responsibility, and I wish to commend them. In some ways, the fact that industry - we have examples of industry across the world that is showing a lead in its own actions in reducing the carbon intensity of their processes, in part inspires us all as governments to do better. Interestingly, I suspect they will be in the end the economic winners as well. And I suspect countries that do move early and take full advantage of the least cost opportunities will be economic winners as well.
Thank you for inviting me back again, and I hope I can come back next year with better news.
[APPLAUSE]
Eileen Claussen: Well thank you and let me just say that we - no, don't go because we really want you to answer some questions. But while you're coming back, let me just say that we love the 33 companies that we work with, but they don't actually support us in any financial way. They give us lots of support and lots of input and we work together really closely, but our funding does come from charitable foundations, primarily the Pew Charitable Trust. So I just wanted to clear that up.
Senator Hill, I know you'd love to take questions so why don't we see where they are? There's a microphone over there and that will just make everything easier for all of us.
Q: My name is David Benjamin and I'm from Third Planet. I'd like to know how the work on the global warming policy in Australia has, if it has at all, impacted your foreign aid work and capacity building that you do in the Pacific region? And second question is, do you think there is a role to play in global warming work for the Green Corps?
MR. HILL: It hasn't had any - well, its consequence on our support for developing countries in the region has been largely incidental, except to say that we're supporting such countries in greenhouse programs in terms of adaptation, in terms of accounting and reporting, and we're also working with countries in the region in terms of joint projects which hopefully will evolve into CDM-type projects in the future. And the Green Corps, I didn't understand that question.
Eileen Claussen: It's Mikhail Gorbachev's program, the Green Cross.
MR. HILL: Well, I don't know how that affects me?
Eileen Claussen: Okay, other questions. I think it's just easier if you go to the microphone. I mean, maybe you should just go to the microphone.
Q: Benito Muller from Oxford. Oxford is quite remote and we don't get news that often. And I was wondering, we do know that this developing country participation is heavily on the agenda. But could you be a bit more specific on how you could envisage -- if Kyoto is scuppered, how this participation should function? What do you expect developing countries to take on more than they would do under Kyoto?
Thank you.
MR. HILL: We haven't defined that because we believe it would be presumptuous to do so. But we've sought to enter into a debate and we do it every meeting with developing countries. It often is a fairly one-sided debate. But as I said, as we think through the principle of differentiation it should be possible to make commitments for the future that are relative to a range of different factors, in particular the structure of the economy in question, its strength, population growth, and the like.
We, as with others, have developed a range of indicators which we think can be of assistance in this regard. We think, as the CDM develops, there may be opportunities within that as part of a total formula. And we have other ideas in relation to technology transfer, which is going to be a critical part of it as well.
In addition to that, we do recognize that there will be a need for incentives, and we've indicated and particularly started a discussion at the Hague with developing countries as to what form those incentives and support might take. So nobody says it's the commitment that the developed countries - that it acquits to the commitment that developing countries have taken. We accept the obligations of the convention, that it does require developed countries to lead. But in terms of global outcome it is going to require a genuine participation and commitment of all.
Q: Caps? Caps?
MR. HILL: Well I used the word commitment, but targets. The timetable would be different, the form of the target might be different. We think there's a long way to go within the debate, but we think that the debate needs -- well, we would like to have seen the debate progress further than what it has to date. A little too much finger pointing and I think not enough actually sitting down and working on it.
Eileen Claussen: I think we can take two other questions. Yeah, if you'd just go to the microphone, please. Yes, go ahead.
Q: But my name is Jiahua Pan from the IPCC Working Group 3, Technical Support Unit. Well, my question is something very general. It's the maintainability of equity. If we look at the income distribution in the developed and developing countries, you can see that using the genie index as a measurement, in the developed countries the genie co-efficient or index is something, you know, between -- it's around 0.25. Equity is zero, and, you know, inequality is 1. But if we look a the developing countries, the genie index is about 0.4. In Brazil for example, it's 0.61.
That means that in the developed countries it's more equal and in the developing countries it's more unequal in terms of income distribution. That would suggest that for the developed countries we are equal, but we do not want to extend our equity to the poor countries. And for the poor countries, we're unequal, but we would like to be equal with the rich.
So I think that's the current mentality of equity. So I would like to ask your idea about if there is any possibility to change the mentality of equity?
Thanks.
MR. HILL: I have no quarrel with that aspiration, and what I hinted at is I think that this process shouldn't be seen as totally as threat. I think that part of a closing of that equity gap may incorporate the opportunity to take economic and environmental advantage from evolving technologies and processes. And that's part of the engagement that I would like to see take place with developing countries. No one is arguing that developing countries should come out of this process poorer. Everyone accepts their right to develop and their right to improve standards of living. What we would wish, however, to occur is that that now occur in a way that is less carbon intense than has been the process of development in the past. And we now have the capacity to see that, in fact, becomes a reality. The goal is therefore a win-win goal, both, as I said, environmentally and economically.
Eileen Claussen: Last question.
Q: Paul Fauteux from Canada, Senator.
I'd like to draw you out, if I may, on the issue of timing of enhanced developing country participation. As Ambassador Estrada reminded us, the convention was -- basically it deals to the effect that developed countries would go first. And as Ambassador Estrada also reminded us, it's expected that one of the critical issues in the negotiations for the second commitment period would be the form of enhanced developing country participation.
You referred to efforts on the past of Australia, Canada and other group members in The Hague to start a dialogue on what form those commitments might take. I do get the impression that the current administration in Washington, if they haven't actually reached that conclusion, are heavily leaning in favor of the view that we can 't wait till the second commitment period, we have to have developing countries join developed countries in taking measures to address climate change first.
I was wondering if you could tell us where Australia stands in that respect.
MR. HILL: Again, we haven't sought to be prescriptive. We don't think that that's an effective response. I acknowledged in answer to a previous question I anticipate different timetables. I anticipate different forms of commitment. I think that one of the -- one of the -- I've been hesitant to speak for the [US] administration. Perhaps one would have a go at speaking for the last administration, because I think in many ways it was addressing the same issue in that it was negotiating at The Hague and elsewhere to a background that it knew that unless it had a formula, it had a resolution to the developing country issue, it simply was never going to have a ratified protocol. It's a fair odd -- I mean you have a great advantage in the United States where your administration can negotiate something that whilst at the same time it can say, well, it's another party that ultimately determines whether it becomes legally binding or not. But they would never -- you know, I understood the administration was always arguing in good faith. It therefore knew that it always had to find an answer to the issue raised by the Congress, which is an issue slightly different to Australia. The issue in the United States, I think looking in the global perspective, was simply that whilst on a per capita basis, the carbon is much less intense in China, a small fraction of the United States, nevertheless if our bottom line in this whole exercise is actually to stabilize global greenhouse gases and emissions from the developing world are about to overtake the developed world, then, politically, an administration has got to show that every party is going to play its card.
And the response from China, of course, will be, well, we are already building our economy in a less carbon intense way. In some ways it's being an incidental benefit coming out of programs designed to improve air quality. But that is politically insufficient, because it's not seen as a commitment. But it doesn't seem to me that if the developing country says -- I hear them say that they're already implementing their own programs to achieve a better outcome. It doesn't seem to be a huge step forward to be able to design and express that in terms of a commitment and take a step, therefore, towards resolving a problem that both the past and the existing administration in the United States will have in terms of congressional approval.
Q: Thank you.
Eileen Claussen: Thank you very much.