Remarks by Jan Pronk Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, The Netherlands
April 17, 2001
1:30 pm [EDST]
Transcript by:
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.
Eileen Claussen: I hope everybody's enjoyed their lunch and their talking, but I think it's time now for another interesting presentation and an interesting speaker. Our speaker at this lunch is Jan Pronk. He is the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment of the Netherlands. He was a member of the Lower House of Parliament for the Labor Party from 1971 to 1973, from 1978 to 1980, and from 1986 to 1989. From 1973 to 1977, he served as Minister for Development Cooperation, and from 1980 to 1985 was Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. But I think most important of all, for us, he is the President of the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
He chaired the meeting in The Hague. He will chair the meeting for COP 6 resumed in Bonn. He is not speaking here for the Netherlands, and he is not speaking here for the European Union: he is speaking as the chairman of the meeting. There's only one other thing before he comes up and talks to you; he will take questions afterward. We would prefer that the press not ask him questions right afterwards. He will be at the Press Club tomorrow morning at 9:00 AM and will take questions then. And I think it's perfectly fair game for you to attack him as soon as he leaves the room and goes out into the very spacious hallway that we have here. I'm so sorry, Jan, please come up and give us a spirited discussion.
JAN PRONK: Thank you, Eileen. I hope you can hear me in the back. Indeed, I am here in my capacity as the president of the Conference of Parties and not in any other capacity. I consider myself as a guardian of a multilateral process. So, see me, in particular, now, as a United Nations person.
The Hague was not a failure. We did not yet reach a result; we did not yet meet the expectations of our citizens. So we decided to resume. There were two reasons why we were not able yet to reach a result. The real negotiations started late -- too late, in my view. We took too much time to explain to each other how right we were. And secondly, there was a very complex issue, which came up in the middle of last year, in a very specific fashion, and it involves the whole issue of sinks. And countries were not ready, at the time, to take a decision on that particular issue.
Of course, there were many other issues not yet agreed upon, but they all were very strongly dependent on and related to the possibility to reach a result on that key issue, which was partly target and related to the capacity of sinks. So we said, "We give ourselves a second chance. Let's resume as soon as possible, because we do not want to lose the political momentum. Let's resume in May, somewhere in Bonn." Then I got a phone call from the State Department early in January, from the administration in transition. "Could you please, Mr. Chairman, postpone the session to be resumed with, say, two months, on behalf of the Foreign Secretary to be, General Powell? Two months, so that we can prepare ourselves better for the resumed session, because we are a new administration."
I checked whether that was a formal request, and whether it really did mean that the new administration was in favor of a resumption because other options were also available not to resume at all, or let's wait for COP 7. "No we want to prepare ourselves well for a resumed session, which means we want to resume." Which is more than a formality, because you resume on the basis of what you discussed in COP 6. And after having come to the conclusion that it was indeed a serious request, I tried to convince all groups of countries that it really was desirable not to resume in May but in July. The request was confirmed a couple of times and also supported by a number of other countries.
It took me a lot of trouble to convince all country groups that it would be desirable to meet later. Countries were afraid that the political momentum would get lost. But finally, we got agreement, and we took the decision to resume in July. I was surprised by the fact that in March, two days after I got my final results, all of the sudden, there were statements to the effect, here in Washington, that Kyoto is dead. So I came and asked whether that was a result of a political consultation. And the answer was, "No, we want to engage ourselves in an open policy review." And an open policy review means two things: no preconceived results, and we also want to have a dialogue with other countries open.
And that is indeed what is going on at the moment. In my view, as president of the conference, despite surprises, I am of the opinion that these months, until July, ought to be used for a good policy review, and that the time requested ought to be granted to countries in order to have a good and constructive resumed session in July. I am very hopeful that that meeting will produce a good result, because all my contacts with all participants after The Hague have brought me to the conclusion that there is a tremendous change going on in the political flexibility of countries. Governments have come to the conclusion that a second failure cannot take place, because they cannot take that responsibility; they cannot explain that to the electorate.
On that basis, and after many consultations, and having studied all the amendments, I have presented a new paper, which I did issue a week ago, reflecting my perception of a possible compromise between all positions, having listened to all substantive points which were raised on the basis of previous positions. This new paper could serve as a new input into the negotiations. It is not, again, not a take-it-or-leave-it paper, but again, a take-it-and-improve-it further paper, which could serve as a possible basis for a balance between many positions in Bonn.
In that paper, I have taken into account points which were raised by all country groups. It was not possible to take into account points of view raised by the new American administration. And, for that reason, I took the proxy, and that was the list of points raised by the previous American administration, of which I have come to the conclusion that it was an administration which had negotiated very skillfully, American interests. And please, do not underestimate the results of the previous American administration in serving American interests, in terms of instruments, in terms of criteria.
But please, come as soon as possible with all new points to be raised, so that, indeed, a negotiation on the basis of such papers, which can change, of course, can take place as soon as possible.
In the present discussion, there are a number of misunderstandings -- seven. I would like to address all of them very briefly, as a politician. Number one: evidence. Scientific insights have shown us that climate change is going faster than expected; that a big part of climate change is man-made. It's a result of what people do and what the economy does to cause global warming; that actual developments, which we've witnessed in present day life, in terms of weather conditions, also are related to climate change. Greater extremes in temperatures, storms, different rainfall patterns than before, they are, in one way or another, related to climate change.
Insights also do show us that the consequences of climate change, in terms of ocean warming, sea level rise, in terms of coastal erosion and threatening islands, in terms of agricultural production potentialities, are bigger than we did expect 10, 20 years ago. And we also know, without doubt, that such consequences will be, in particular, alarming for poor countries, in a very specific geographic zone in the world, and we know that these poor countries do have less capacity to protect themselves against the consequences, much less capacity than, for instance, European countries or the United States, to protect themselves against the consequences of climate change.
This is the common view, I would say, of a very broad and balanced group of scientists. And they show, in my view, that action is urgent. Now, the answer is to the politicians. There is, in my view, no reason anymore to postpone action. There always, of course, will be scientists who will raise doubts, and who claim that there is no fool-proof. They're right. There is no fool-proof. But politicians have to act; political leaders have to act on the basis of precaution. They should be well advised not to use the not-yet 100 percent proof as a pretext for non-action.
There's no point, in my view, in disputing the scientific basis for action in the field of climate change. If you want to dispute, if you want to disagree, disagree on instruments, disagree on targets, disagree on guidelines. Don't disagree anymore on the scientific basis.
Second misunderstanding: equity. It is being said that the Kyoto Protocol exempts developing countries from compliance, and that excluding developing countries from any responsibility to reduce emissions, perhaps in perpetuity, would be unfair and would doom the protocol to failure. This is not true, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the per capita emissions in rich countries, for instance, in Europe and the United States, are more than 20 times as high as the per capita emissions in poor countries. Secondly, historic emissions, leading to the present climate change, also, hurting poor countries more than rich countries, do come from rich countries. So equity requires that industrialized countries start reducing their emissions. Others can follow.
Thirdly, developing countries have taken upon them commitments and obligations. These are enshrined in a number of articles in the convention as well as in the protocol. They were granted in Kyoto an exemption in terms of specific quantitative targets and timetables. And this is in line with the internationally accepted principle of common and differentiated responsibilities, and with good international practice in international trade -- for instance, preferential treatment to be granted to countries in transition or countries in development.
Many developing countries do take action to save energy, to reduce emissions in their own, well understood interest. Moreover, developing countries need to be assisted in joining later -- for instance, in the second decade of this century. They have been promised assistance to enable them to cope with the consequences of climate change, to develop sound policies, to apply new technologies, to build their own capacity. Keeping the promise to assist developing countries and taking the lead in reducing rich countries' own pollution, is the most equitable, the most effective, and the most promising way to bring developing countries on board.
Third misunderstanding on energy. Economic growth requires more energy. Now, it's being stated that the Kyoto Protocol is a straitjacket, hindering economic growth by restricting countries' possibilities to address potential or actual energy shortages. This, in my view, is another misunderstanding. On the contrary, the Kyoto Protocol helps countries to broaden the basis of economic growth with a more diversified energy basket, not only fossil fuels, oil, coal, but also gas, also renewables, biomass, wind, solar. The Kyoto Protocol helps by fostering new energy technologies such as the fuel cell; by supporting energy efficiency; by supporting energy conservation; by also mitigating energy demand rather than only focusing on energy supply. In short, the Kyoto Protocol is not a hindrance but a help.
Fourth misunderstanding on economics. It's being stated that the Kyoto Protocol would cause serious harm to the U.S. and, potentially, to the global economies. Again, this is a misunderstanding. On the contrary, there is wide agreement that the necessary technology to address climate change is available already. It doesn't have to be invented; it only has to be applied. And calculations show that the costs involved are affordable, and that the short run retrogression of economic growth will be minimal, whereas the long run economic growth would be made, thereby, sustainable.
Moreover, costs of non-action are much greater. Economic damage from climate change-related natural disasters is tremendous already and will mount further. Some countries may be able to protect themselves against such consequences, for instance, by, in my country, building very high dikes or dams, stemming rising water levels or by relocating vulnerable industrial sites. But that, indeed, would slow down long-run economic growth. So, acting on climate change does not threaten economic growth; it guarantees economic growth for future generations, our children and grandchildren.
Fifth misunderstanding on the protocol itself. It's being said that the protocol is rigid and that it would restrain the market. That's a misunderstanding as well. The protocol is technological change-oriented. It is oriented towards chances for private business; it is oriented to international trade; it is creating a level playing field for all parties and for all companies in all party countries; it has a great flexibility in the choice of instruments; and cost-effectiveness has been accepted by parties as a leading principle. It is not rigid; it is a flexible protocol, provided the acceptance of targets, reasonable targets, and timeframes, which, indeed, are necessary in order to have a level playing field amongst all countries, and in order to guarantee certainty on world markets.
Sixth misunderstanding on the process. After Kyoto, we agreed on the principles and the targets, and we started to negotiate it soonest. We have not yet succeeded; I did say so. And it's being said that because of the fact that we did not yet succeed, negotiations have produced book-length, internally inconsistent rules. Indeed, the Kyoto Protocol is not perfect. It still contains loopholes, sometimes insisted upon by negotiating parties, including the U.S., Europe, G77. There are loopholes. We can improve that. We have done so in The Hague, and we can do that further, up to and finally in Bonn, three months from now. That is our task. And I am convinced, as I did indicate, that it is possible. And that means that we should not waste past efforts, since 1992, ten years ago in Rio, when it all started.
We should not insist on starting over. If you want to change something, because you still think there are loopholes and mistakes, the rational attitude is not to step aside; the rational attitude if you want to change something is to negotiate, to come with proposals and to listen to counter-proposals in order to solve loopholes and to get agreement. It is not at all necessary to start all over, because we are discussing and negotiating a program, a very flexible program, for a first period, which, as we have promised ourselves also, will have, during its implementation until 2012, contain many learning-by-doing elements, which can serve as a basis for further improvement during the next period, which we still have to decide when to start, how long to last, with whom to carry out.
That is the way we also did start our negotiations in other multilateral frameworks, for instance, on the multilateral trading system in the GATT, after 1945, and it did serve the world well. Start, in a not too ambitious way, not too high targets, cost effective, learning by doing, step by step, new rounds of negotiations, the Dillon Round, the Kennedy Round, the Uruguay Round, reaching at a certain moment, the situation in which there is a full level playing field for all. It can be done also for climate.
And finally, on politics. So energy, equity, economy, evidence, protocol process, politics. Let's face it, we are -- and I did use the word in the beginning of my talk -- engaging ourselves in a multilateral process. And, as we are doing that, we took that decision in 1992. When we do so, we know that no individual participant in a multilateral process can declare the process or the possible outcome of the process of multilateral negotiations dead. That is not the right of any individual participant, whether it's a small one or a big one. It's up to the multilateral community as a whole to take the decisions on the nature of the future of the process.
Let's face it, since 1945 -- and I mentioned GATT as a beginning -- we have learned that there is a lot of virtue in multilateral negotiations on global issues. And if there is any global issue, it's climate change. That doesn't stop at national frontiers. Of course, national policies are necessary, also, to implement multilateral negotiations. Can they substitute for a multilateral process? No, they cannot, because these national policies cannot be carried out in isolation. They require coordination. Climate change and also the policy consequence of policies to address climate change do not stop at national borders.
In this country, there will be the effect of climate change emanating from pollution in Europe. In this country, there will be the effect of policies to address climate change coming from Europe and vice versa. You need each other; all countries do need each other. The sum total of about 200 individual national policies is unlikely to be the optimum for the world as a whole. And that is the main reason why it is so important to keep the family together -- also because of the future negotiations, the second round and the third round; also because a failure after so many years of these multilateral negotiations would have consequences for other multilateral negotiations; for instance, in the field of trade; for instance, also, in the field of armaments and on a number of broad issues, because the issue of credibility and confidence in building our multilateral negotiations is crucial.
It's high time, of course, to show our electorates that multilateral negotiations make sense and that we can produce results. Indeed, political credibility is at stake in a multilateral process, which, by nature, requires time -- for decades, sometimes -- like also the trade negotiations sometimes were taking until 15 years. And in that process of decade-long negotiations, always, many countries changed their regimes -- always, in democratic countries, each four years, very often, many changes. That is necessary; it is desirable; and, of course, then there will be policy reviews. But these policy reviews are not only by nature of a domestic character. They are part of an international process, and there are linkages between domestic policy reviews and their international participation in a multilateral framework.
I hope that the family will stay together. Non-participation by, for instance, the United States, would have negative consequences, also in broad political terms, beyond climate, because it would be a blow to confidence, confidence in multilateral diplomacy and in multilateral decision making. Non-participation would also be harmful to the United States itself, for instance, to U.S. business interests, because of the resulting climate-friendly guidelines from products to get access to markets abroad. Non-participation would have major negative consequences for future negotiations on such and other global issues.
So let's decide. We cannot start over. Kyoto is the only game in town, to quote Ms. Whitman. Kyoto is alive. I quote myself. So we go ahead anyway, knowing that effective results will only last if the family stays together, and the family ought to stay together. And in order to keep the family together, we need two things. We need flexibility of all parts, listening to each other, taking each other's specific problems into account, because we need each other, we need flexibility; and we need a sense of responsibility towards each other, towards the process, and towards future generations. Thank you for your attention.
Eileen Claussen: We'll be happy to take a few good questions. In the back there.
Q: Hello. If the United States, in Bonn in July, decides not to take part in the Kyoto Protocol, do you have a plan B?
MR. PRONK: Yes, I have a plan B, but more importantly is whether other parties would have a plan B. I've suggested -- my main thing is we go ahead anyway, yeah. But that can be done in different ways. It is for countries to decide on plan B. On Saturday this week, there is a crucial meeting of 40 to 50 key countries, coming together at a high political level. And I know that the policy review of the United States is not yet ready, but what other countries are expecting is an interim indication, so that they can react and give advice on how to work towards Bonn. And I hope very much that an agreement can be the final outcome.
I have a plan B, but more importantly is whether all the other countries do have a plan B. I know that some do have, but why speak too early about plan B when plan A is still in the making? Because there is an open policy review, and we do not yet know the outcome of that policy review.
Eileen Claussen: No, this is not a cause for laughter. Yes, in the back there.
Q: Thank you. Having participated in the Indigenous Peoples Forum at The Hague Conference, and realizing that in The Hague Declaration from Indigenous Peoples around the world, there were concerns about sinks, and there was certainly a positive underscoring of renewable energy and a voice for indigenous peoples in the COP process; and that this is a conference on equity in global climate change. And indigenous peoples are likely, with subsistence cultures, to feel the brunt more so than any other particular group. Would you comment, please, on the progress of the requests made in The Hague declaration?
MR. PRONK: Equity is not only equity amongst countries but also within countries. And the greater, also -- sinks, forests, agricultural land systems, in the future will be taken into account also as part of an integrated overall policy, the more important it will be to involve also people, farmers, indigenous groups relying on such capacities. Equity is also a domestic issue. And I call on governments and on NGOs to make that issue, indeed, again, involved.
Eileen Claussen: We'll take one more, if there is one more. This is in order to facilitate the reporters outside.
Q: Thank you very much. I am from Tanzania. I just wanted to know if the U.S., at the resumed COP, will put on the table a counter proposal, which probably will entail negotiating the Kyoto Protocol, would you take it?
MR. PRONK: A counter proposal, which -- because, in order to be very clear.
Q: Which entails a renegotiating of the Kyoto Protocol. Will you take it?
MR. PRONK: I've always said that the targets ought to be considered agreed. The main principles also ought to be considered agreed. For instance, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. But there is still room for negotiation on specific conditions, with regards to the way in which we are going to reach the targets, instruments. And I made some indication in that paper, I'm eager to listen to proposals; I'm not eager to listen to a proposal to start all over again. That's a waste of capital, also of human capital, and also of capital of our people, which have expressed confidence in political leaders, invested in 10 years.
Eileen Claussen: Well, thank you, very, very much. And I guess we'll resume across the hall. Thank you.
[Applause and End of Event.]